Intelligence and Nuclear Non-Proliferation Programs: The Achilles Heel

Kristen Lau (University of Oxford) and I have a paper accepted for publication in Intelligence and National SecurityKristen was my graduate student at the University of Washington and is now pursuing a doctoral degree at Oxford. We began studying information management failures associated with nuclear non-proliferation efforts in 2009. We presented an early version of the paper at  the Centre for Science and Security Studies (CSSS) at King’s College London.

Abstract: Intelligence is a critical component for all counter-proliferation activities.  It allows us to assess and determine what makes up the current threat environment in terms of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and technology. The intelligence process as it relates to estimating nuclear capabilities or intentions is wrought with many challenges and complications. The denial and deception techniques employed by states running covert weapons programs and the dual-use nature of many weapons components create many difficulties for intelligence organizations. Additionally, illicit transnational networks obscure the situation further by serving as a source, for both nation states and non-state actors, for acquiring dual-use commodities and technologies. These challenges can lead to the miscalculation of a state’s capabilities or intentions. This paper presents a comparative analysis of three cases of nuclear proliferation: India’s 1998 nuclear tests, the exposure of the AQ Khan network, and Iran’s nuclear program. We examine the lessons learned and propose recommendations for future counter proliferation policy and strategy. 

You might find our other paper of interest. It was published in the International Journal of Public Administration.

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